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SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

American Bar Association
Section of International Law
and Practice
Reports to the House of Delegates
I. Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes*
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, That the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes approved jointly by the American Bar Association and the American
Arbitration Association should be amended to provide that unless otherwise
agreed party-appointed arbitrators in international commercial arbitrations
should, to the extent practicable in the circumstances, serve as neutrals.
REPORT
As the result of a five-year process from 1972 to 1977, a Joint Committee of
the American Arbitration Association and the American Bar Association prepared a "Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes" ' which has
*This Recommendation and Report was adopted by the House of Delegates in November 1989.
The Recommendation and Report was prepared by James H. Carter, Chairman of the Section's
Committee on International Commercial Arbitration.
1. See Holtzmann, The First Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 33 Bus.
LAW. 309 (1977), containing a copy of this Code, which also appears in 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 131
(1985).
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been used widely since then in the United States as a guide for parties, arbitrators
and the courts. In preparing that Code, the Joint Committee addressed a question
that has received considerable judicial and scholarly comment: whether partyappointed arbitrators are required under all circumstances to be "neutral" in the
same sense that judges are neutral or unbiased-that is, impartial in their view
of the issues until evidence has been received, and independent of any overly
close relationship with any of the parties.
Arbitral panels often are composed of three arbitrators, frequently with two
arbitrators appointed separately by the parties and the third arbitrator selected by
the first two or through the procedures of an administering arbitral institution.
This method of selection is popular with parties because it permits the choice of
persons with particular types of knowledge and experience, gives the parties
direct participation in the process of resolving their disputes and promotes a
feeling among users of commercial arbitration that this important part of the
process is reasonably predictable.
The Joint Committee ultimately decided that its Code should be a general one
fitting all types of commercial arbitrations and therefore must accommodate the
fact that in some types of arbitration involving such appointment of two arbitrators by each party acting alone, such as labor arbitrations and arbitrations
within some trade groups, it is traditionally expected and voluntarily accepted
that those party-appointees need not be entirely "neutral. ' 2 While the Code's
preamble states a preference that parties agree that all arbitrators shall comply
2. The Committee's special introductory note to Canon VII, "Ethical Considerations Relating
to Arbitrators Appointed By One Party," states:
In some types of arbitration in which there are three arbitrators it is customary for
each party, acting alone, to appoint one arbitrator. The third arbitrator is then appointed
either by agreement of the parties or of the two arbitrators, or, failing such agreement,
by an independent institution or individual. In some of these types of arbitration, all
three arbitrators are customarily considered to be neutral and are expected to observe
the same standards of ethical conduct. However, there are also many types of tripartite
arbitration in which it has been the practice that the two arbitrators appointed by the
parties are not considered to be neutral and are expected to observe many-but not
all-of the same ethical standards as the neutral third arbitrator. For the purposes of
this Code, an arbitrator appointed by one party who is not expected to observe all of
the same standards as the third arbitrator is referred to as a "non-neutral arbitrator."
This Canon VII describes the ethical obligations which non-neutral party-appointed
arbitrators should observe and those which are not applicable to them.
In all arbitrations in which there are two or more party-appointed arbitrators, it is
important for everyone concerned to know from the start whether the party-appointed
arbitrators are expected to be neutrals or non-neutrals. In such arbitrations, the two
party-appointed arbitrators should be considered non-neutrals unless both parties inform the arbitrators that all three arbitrators are to be neutral, or, unless the contract,
the applicable arbitration rules, or any governing law requires that all three arbitrators
are to be neutral.
It should be noted that in cases where the arbitration is conducted outside the United
States the applicable law may require that all arbitrators be neutral. Accordingly, in such
cases the governing law should be considered before applying any of the following
provisions relating to non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
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with the same ethical standards-i.e., neutrality-Canon VII of the AAA-ABA
Code nevertheless deals expressly with such "non-neutral" party appointees by
permitting them to vary their conduct in two basic ways: (1) by being "predisposed" toward the party appointing them (but nonetheless obligated "to act in
good faith and with integrity and fairness" in all arbitral proceedings), and (2)
by having continuing communications with an appointing party. Indeed, under
the AAA-ABA Code such "non-neutral" arbitrators may, subject to the duty to
disclose in general terms that they are doing so, communicate with the party who
appointed them about any aspect of the case. The Code states that it is sufficient
for the arbitrator to disclose the intention to have such communications in the
future, with no requirement that there be disclosure before each separate occasion on which such a communication occurs.
U.S. courts generally have accepted that arbitration is a matter of contract and
have recognized the long and honorable tradition of party-appointed arbitrators
who legitimately function as "partisans once removed from the actual
controversy." 3 In commercial matters, this custom is identified in particular with
certain kinds of "trade" arbitrations in which the appointees are expected by all
concerned to have expert knowledge of the industry and to act to greater or lesser
extent as advocates before a neutral third arbitrator. The Joint Committee memorialized this practice in Canon VII of the Code as one option available to
parties; but it attempted to assure, as the Code states, that all concerned are aware
from the start whether the party-appointed arbitrators are to be neutrals or nonneutrals. If one arbitrator will act as a non-neutral (the implications of which the
Code makes clear), then the other arbitrator, the party who appointed him or her,
and the neutral chairman all should be told of this fact so that they may make
appropriate adjustments in their own conduct. 4 Assurance insofar as possible of
a level playing field was judged more important than attempting to impose on
party-appointed arbitrators standards of neutrality which conflicted with deepseated (but not universal) traditions of U.S. arbitration. The result was a flexible
procedure which recognized differing degrees of neutrality.
Nevertheless, as noted above, the Code made reference in passing to potential
problems "in cases where the arbitration is conducted outside the United
States," where "the applicable law may require that all arbitrators be neutral,"

3. E.g., Stef Shipping Corp. v. Norris Grain Co., 209 F. Supp. 249, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
4. The American Arbitration Association requires disclosure of potentially disqualifying relationships from all arbitrators and regularly discusses neutrality with party-appointed arbitrators at the
outset of an arbitration and solicits their agreement to serve as neutrals. For international cases
administered by the AAA, since 1986 that agency's Supplementary Procedures for International
Commercial Arbitration effectively have required party-appointed arbitrators to serve as neutrals by
providing a right to challenge their impartiality or independence which does not exist under Canon
VII of the AAA-ABA Code as regards party appointees in purely domestic arbitrations. See Hoellering, Arbitrator Selection, 3 ADR REP. 13, 14 (1987); see also Bond, The Selection of ICC
Arbitrators and the Requirement of Independence, 4 Arb. Int'l (no. 4) 300 (1988).
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and counseled consideration of governing law before treating party-appointed
arbitrators as "non-neutral."
Explicit U.S. recognition of the existence of "non-neutral" arbitrators for arbitrations based in the United States, as contrasted with arbitrations conducted elsewhere, has been a subject of criticism among practitioners of international commercial
arbitration, a field in which there is at least a decided tendency toward requiring
party-appointed arbitrators to be less than partisan. This field tends to be more closely
identified with arbitration of'"general" commercial disputes-i.e., disputes between
parties to a particular contract who do not deal with each other regularly in other
contexts as fellow members of the same industry or community-rather than with
arbitration involving particular trades or communities where the "non-neutral" partyappointed arbitrator tradition is more likely to be found.
Critics of non-neutral arbitrators urge that all arbitrators in international arbitration, including party-appointed arbitrators, should be equally unaligned with
the parties or with their views. However, they tend also to recognize that a party
appointee in international arbitrations, like his or her counterpart in domestic
U.S. commercial disputes, is selected by parties with the hope that the appointee
will endorse the appointing party's side and help persuade the chairman of its
correctness. The party may base such hope entirely on its assessment of the
appointee's known views, writings in the field or prior arbitral decisions, without
any suggestion to the arbitrator that he or she should be less than neutral; but the
hope of predisposition nevertheless is common and often is well-founded. Some
observers believe that European practice is not substantially different from domestic U.S. practice in this regard. 5 In particular, some international arbitration
practitioners are dubious of the neutrality of many arbitrators appointed by governmental entities, who may be employees of other agencies of the same government. The President of the American Arbitration Association has questioned
whether the universally "neutral" party-appointed arbitrator in international
' 6
practice is more than an "unreliable myth.
Writers about this issue in international commercial arbitration have recognized
that party appointees may not be entirely neutral; but they argue that appointees
nonetheless should be held to an ethical norm requiring that they be formally
unaffiliated with the appointment party and that they avoid post-appointment ex
parte communications. Such arbitrators still are said to be "impartial" and "independent," even if they are "predisposed" toward one side and thus not entirely
"neutral. ' 7 Party-appointed international arbitrators thus appear to be allowed to
5. See, e.g., Mosk, The Role of Party-AppointedArbitrators in InternationalArbitration:The
Experience of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, I TRANS. LAW. 253, 262 (1988); Higgins, Brown &
Roach, Pitfalls in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 35 Bus. Law. 1035, 1043-44 (1980).
6. Coulson, An American Critique of the IBA's Ethics for InternationalArbitrators, 4 J. Int'l

Arb. 103, 107 (1987).
7. Two leading commentators write:
At first sight it might be thought that no valid distinction may be drawn between the
concepts of impartiality and neutrality. However, it has been suggested that a party
VOL. 24, NO. 4
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be predisposed, just as are "non-neutral" arbitrators under the AAA-ABA Code,
so long as the predisposition arises from personal views of the issues or the parties
rather than from formal affiliation with a party. Such international arbitrators,
however, are not recognized as having the option of announcing that they will
continue post-appointment ex parte communications with a party about the merits
of a dispute as do their U.S. counterparts under the AAA-ABA Code.
The IBA "Ethics"
Beginning in 1985, members of the International Bar Association drafted a set
of principles intended to embody a detailed definition of this potentially "predisposed" but nonetheless "impartial" and "independent" international arbitrator which would be cast in terms that recognized little or no formal distinction
between party-appointed arbitrators and other arbitrators. This document also
was intended to define certain presumptions and preferred procedures that sought
to assure that all arbitrators avoid post-appointment ex parte communications
about the dispute with the parties. These efforts resulted 8in the 1987 IBA "Ethics
for Arbitrators in International Commercial Disputes."
A document setting forth ethical principles for arbitrators should serve a
variety of purposes. It should help acquaint prospective parties to arbitrations
and prospective arbitrators with the aspirational norms of the process, lead them
to think well of its potential and encourage them to participate in developing
arbitration in a constructive way. Ethical codes also should provide practical
guidance on preferred procedures, while doing so in a sufficiently general way
to avoid usurping the function of detailed and not always entirely consistent
procedural rules and requirements found in institutional rules and in governing
arbitration statutes. Ethical codes ideally also should, to the extent possible,
make clear what sorts of practices are clearly acceptable in a world of
formalized private dispute resolution, so that frivolous challenges to arbitral
awards on grounds of arbitrator misconduct are minimized and courts are given
guidance.
The IBA "Ethics" is a significant contribution to the development of thinking
about the role of the party-appointed arbitrator, but it is only partly successful in

may nominate an arbitrator who is generally predisposed toward him, personally, or
as regards his position in the dispute, provided that he is at the same time capable of
applying his mind judicially and impartially to the evidence and arguments submitted
by both sides.
Redfern & Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 171 (1986); see also
Tapman, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration, 38
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 26 (1989); Craig, Park & Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration Pt. III, para. 12.04 (1984).
8. 26 I.L.M. 583 (1987). The drafters decided not to call the document a "code" because this
might suggest courts should use its standards as a basis for setting aside arbitral awards on grounds
of bias. They selected instead the title "Ethics."
WINTER 1990
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meeting all of these goals for an ideal general code. The principal impetus for it
was to codify international resistance to "non-neutral" arbitrators who engage in
ex parte communications with parties and sometimes even have engaged in
directly disruptive conduct such as provocation of postponements. The "Ethics"
does a good job of defining "impartiality" and "independence" consistently
with the understanding discussed above. It codified as a "fundamental rule" 9
that all arbitrators will be held to the same standards of non-bias in this regard.
The tone of the "Ethics," however, tends to be rather heavily prohibitory, with
procedural details designed to assure that deviations from ethical principles will
be avoided or, if discovered, sanctioned by being made generally known. The
overall effect may suggest that unethical conduct by arbitrators is a significant
danger to be anticipated, rather than emphasizing encouragement of high principles because these are good for the parties and the arbitral process.
It has been suggested that the IBA "Ethics" is unrealistic in leaving a party
confronting an obviously partisan appointee for the other side little opportunity
to level the playing field except a successful challenge to the partisan-a remedy
which may not always be available or appropriate.
The "Ethics" also has been criticized on a number of detailed points. Some urge
that it should go further and address in greater detail subjects such as impartiality in
the conduct of proceedings and the issue of confidentiality versus publication of
awards. Some have suggested drafting changes that might be considered if the IBA
prepares a second version of the "Ethics."' 0 Others have suggested it should recognize an option for parties to agree expressly on the acceptability of two "nonneutral" arbitrators, reversing the AAA-ABA Code's presumption that party appointees are non-neutral unless otherwise agreed but still maintaining flexibility.
The prohibitory tone of the IBA "Ethics" and the nature of some of its
procedural details ultimately led the draftsmen to suggest that it be made available for incorporation by parties as a part of their contracts but not promulgated
as a statutory model or a guide to which courts should look in all circumstances
when ruling on challenges in international [sic]. The IBA's introductory note to
the "Ethics" states:
The rules cannot be directly binding either on arbitrators, or on the parties themselves,
unless they are adopted by agreement. Whilst the International Bar Association hopes
they will be taken into account in the context of challenges to arbitrators, it is emphasized that these guidelines are not intended to create grounds for the setting aside of
awards by national courts ....The International Bar Association wishes to make it
clear that it is not the intention of these rules to create opportunities for aggrieved
parties to sue international arbitrators in national courts.

9. IBA "Ethics," Rule 1.
10. For example, IBA "Ethics" Rules 3.3 and 4.2(b) make certain relationships between an
arbitrator and a party or a "potentially important" witness a presumptive basis for justifiable doubts
as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence, but fails to include relationships with representatives of a party, such as the party's lawyers, in this category.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
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Amendment of the AAA-ABA Code of Ethics
In order to align the AAA-ABA Code more closely with the general trend
toward favoring neutrality of party-appointed arbitrators in international matters,
it should be amended to clarify that this is a special concern in arbitrations
occurring in the United States as well as those cited elsewhere or governed by
foreign law. The amended Code should continue to stress neutrality as an aspirational goal, to be followed insofar as practicable in the circumstances, in
recognition of the fact that parties to international arbitrations nevertheless may
agree to appoint "non-neutrals" or to accept standards of conduct for them at
odds with those preferred under the Code.
The amendment, which is being considered by the American Arbitration Association, would replace the third paragraph of the Introductory Note to Canon
VII ("Ethical Considerations Relating To Arbitrators Appointed By One Party")
with the following:
Many commercial arbitrations now involve parties from different countries, sometimes including governmental trading or other organizations. While these arbitrations

often are similar to arbitrations between two American parties and involve the same
considerations of arbitrator ethics, in international proceedings there may be a heightened need to assure impartiality of all the decisionmakers. Whether these arbitrations
occur in the United States or elsewhere, the standards of arbitrator neutrality applied
may affect international enforceability of the award. Arbitrators in all international
commercial matters should, to the extent practicable in the circumstances, serve as
neutrals.
Conclusion
The general trend toward neutrality of all arbitrators in international commercial arbitrations should be encouraged. In view of the variety of context in which
international commercial arbitration occurs, however, it is not yet possible to say
that there is an international consensus in favor of mandatory ethical norms
requiring neutrality in all circumstances. The IBA "Ethics" recognizes this by
providing for its express incorporation in agreements intended to provide for
arbitration solely by neutral arbitrators. The American Bar Association should
endorse the principle of full neutrality as a goal, but retain for the present the
flexibility provided by the 1977 AAA-ABA Code of Ethics.
Respectfully submitted,
James R. Silkenat,
Chairman
Section of International Law and Practice
February, 1990
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